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This study is an expanded version of the CESifo Working Paper No. 528 published in 2001.
For the empirical analyses tax depreciation measures in Eastern European Transition
countries are considered.2
Introduction
Promoting investment is of particular importance in the European transition economies
since investments act as growth engine. In this context, the corporate tax regimes adopted
in these countries play a crucial role for stimulating private investment. Accordingly, the
tax systems have to be designed to attract capital. Apart from the tax rates, due attention
has to be paid to depreciation, since it is one of the important factors affecting firms’
investment decisions, as it is deducted from a gross stream of return generated from the
asset when calculating tax profits. Along with straight-line depreciation (applied in
Hungary and Bulgaria), geometric-degressive depreciation which may be employed in
Poland and the Czech Republic and accelerated depreciation, all aim to encourage firm’s
investment activities (Sinn, 1987; King, 1977; King and Fullerton, 1984; Sandmo, 1974;
Jacobs and Spengel, 1996; Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten, 1999). In assessing their
relative generosity, a useful benchmark is that of Samuelson’s true economic depreciation
(TED), which is neutral with respect to investment decisions (Samuelson, 1964; Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1980).
The incentive effects of different tax depreciation rules combined with the corporate tax
rate on firms’ investment decisions can be compared on the basis of the net present value
model (Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2002). Without taxation, the net present value
(NPV) is equal to the present value of future gross return, discounted at an appropriate
interest rate less the present value of the cost of investment. An investment project is
therefore considered to be profitable when the NPV is positive. After the introduction of
tax on corporate income, the present value of the asset generated from an investment
amounts to the sum of present value of net return (gross return less taxes) and tax savings
led by an incentive depreciation provision. If the investment is self-financed, the interest
rate directly corresponds to the investor’s opportunity cost. Under the assumption of a
perfect competitive market structure, there is only one interest rate in the financial market.
In addition, anticipated effects of inflation on firms’ investment decisions are examined
in the context of corporate income taxation. The central issue is that the so-called
historical cost accounting method, which is applied in practice when calculating the
(corporate or income) tax base, causes fictitious profits in inflationary phases that are also
subject to tax. This type of increased tax burden is generally called inflation losses (Aaron,
1976; Feldstein, 1979; Streißler, 1982; Gonedes, 1984; Kay, 1977; Kopcke, 1981).
Therefore, in periods with inflation generous tax depreciation provisions do not adequately
promote private investment as designed, but only (or partly) compensate the losses caused
by inflation.
The aspect of inflation linked with different depreciation rules is of particular
importance in transition countries, where their economies have continuously been3
confronted with rising prices during the last decade. Additionally, the different tax
depreciation rules allowed in these countries can have different incentive effects.
Accordingly, this study aims at examining the corporate tax incentive schemes in Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. The empirical
results show that, for example, in Poland — under the assumption that depreciation is
measured based on the current replacement cost — the tax neutrality is guaranteed, since
geometric-degressive depreciation is set to be same as the assumed true economic
depreciation. In this case inflation and corporate tax do not negatively affect investment
decisions. On the other hand, the combination of accelerated depreciation and the
historical cost accounting method leads, in Romania, to a tax paradox which increases
with debt-finance, although inflation results in an extra tax burden.
I. Samuelson’s Tax Neutrality of True Economic Depreciation
Revisited
Under the assumption that
•   a self-financed investment costing C generates an infinite stream of future gross return,
•   this return exponentially declines at the rate α  (0 < α  < 1)
1 and
•   all prices are constant over time (π  = 0),
the present value of the asset before taxation at time u* is:
                            ∞  A0e
–α u*
(I-1) PVu*
E  =  ∫  A0 e
–α u e
–r(u–u*) du  =  
                                        u*    α +r
where Au means gross return at time u and r is the real interest rate (0 < r < 1) before
imposing corporate tax.
On the basis of such a simple net present value model, Samuelson (1964) showed in his
fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance that corporate income taxation does not affect
firms’ investment decisions at all, when the true economic depreciation (TED) is deducted
from an expected gross stream of return generated from the asset when calculating tax
profits.
                    
1 The assumption of declining gross return in the course of time is often made in practice, because it is
hardly possible to forecast the development of future profit. This type of assumption appears to be more
plausible than the one with constant annual profit.4
Taxation does not affect firms’ investment decisions if
(I-2) PVu*
E  =  PV(t)u*
E,
where PV(t)u*
E is the present value of the asset after the introduction of corporate tax rate t
at time u*, discounted at r(1–t).
When equation (I-2) is applied, one can derive
   ∂ PVu*
E
                ∂ PV(t)u*
E
(I-3)     =     .
        ∂ u*                 ∂ u*
Differentiating (I-1) with respect to u*
              ∂ PVu*
E
            –α A0e
-α u*
(I-4)     =       =  –α  PVu*
E  .
       ∂ u*             α +r
Consequently, tax neutrality is guaranteed when
        ∂ PV(t)u*
E
(I-5) —————  =  –α PVu*
E
   .
           ∂ u*
True economic depreciation (TED) is defined as the negative change in value of the asset
in the course of time. Therefore, the TED rate can be calculated as follows:
         TEDu*
(I-6) —–———  =  α ,
          PVu*
E
which is the same as the rate with which the gross return declines in the course of time.
2
Furthermore, if we have a TED function with respect to u, which also declines at the
rate α , then
(I-7) TEDu  =  α PV0
Ee
–α u    .
                    
2 In the case of assuming a constant gross return function (α  = 0) with regard to time u, this model
automatically leads to the ‘unusual’ conclusion that the TED rate is zero. Furthermore, with an
exponentially ascending gross return function, the TED rate is unrealistically negative, which is
interpreted by Samuelson (1964) as the appreciation of asset value in the course of time.5
In the case that TED is permitted as a tax-deductible depreciation expense,
                                 ∞
(I-8) PV(t)u*
E  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–α ue
–r(1–t)(u–u*) du
                                 u*
                              ∞
 +  t ∫  α  PV0 e
–α u e
–r(1–t)(u–u*) du
                              u*
                            (1–t)A0 e
–α u*         tα PVu*
E
 =  —————  +  ————   =  PVu*
E
                              α +r(1–t)            α +r(1–t)
Thus, the condition shown in equation (I-5) is also satisfied.
II. Modigliani-Miller Theorem of Capital Structure Revisited
Modigliani and Miller (1958) asserted that under certain assumptions such as perfect
markets (i.e. no taxes or transaction costs), the cash flows that are independent of financial
structure, and riskless debt such that firms and individuals can borrow and lend at a risk
free interest rate, the market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure. This
theory can also be shown in terms of the present value model as follows.
For equity finance the following condition satisfies in the equilibrium
(II-1) PV0
E = C
In the case of financing the investment cost C through debt, a firm pays the creditor not
only the annual interest of rC for s year long but also the entire amount of C to the creditor
at the end of this maturity year. Therefore, the present value of total cost at year 0 (C*0)
can be expressed:
       s
(II-2) C*0  = ∫   rCe
-ru du + Ce
-rs
      0
        = (1-e
-rs)C + Ce
-rs = C  .
Hence, in the absence of tax, for example, the condition shown in equation (II-1) applies in
the equilibrium regardless of the financial structure (i.e. C*0 = C = PV0).6
In the equilibrium without tax, equation (II-3) additionally proves that inflation does
not matter for financial decision making either.
         s
(II-3) nC*0  = ∫   (r+π )Ce 
-(r + π )u du + Ce 
-(r + π )s
        0
   1 – e 
-(r+π )s
     = (r+π )C { —————— } + Ce 
-(r+π )s = C = PV0
E ,
  r+π
where nC*0 = the nominal present value of total cost at 0 and π  = inflation rate.
III. Effects of Various Tax Depreciation Rules on Investment Decision
Revealed in Present Value Model
In the practice of tax policy, different tax depreciation rules are employed which do not
typically ensure TED; furthermore, their generosity has been extended to stimulate private
investment. These tax depreciation measures include:
•   straight-line depreciation
•   geometric-degressive depreciation
•   accelerated depreciation
In the following we will discuss several types of investment decisions made in different
real economic situations — with or without taxes, investments financed by equity or debt,
and different depreciation allowances.
1.  No taxes
1.1. Equity finance
In the absence of taxation an equity-financed investment project is on the margin of
acceptance at the year of investment, when
                       ∞                                A0
(III-1) C  =  PV0
E  =  ∫  A0e
–(α +r)u du  =  ———  .
                       0                               α +r
In this case, the NPV amounts to zero.7
1.2. Debt finance
For the debt-financed investment the comparable condition applies, when
        ∞              s
(III-2) Ce
–rs =  ∫  A0e
–(α +r)u du  –  ∫  rCe
–ru du
        0            0
    A0
=  ——— – (1 – e
–rs)C  =  PV0
E – (1 – e
–rs)C .
   α +r
2.  Taxation and straight-line depreciation
In the case of adopting straight-line depreciation over Γ  years, the amount of depreciation
expense of the period u is calculated
               C
(III-3) Du
sld  =  —— ,
                Γ
where u = 1, 2, ...... Γ .
2.1. Equity finance
In the case of equity finance the present value of the asset with straight-line depreciation at
the year 0 is
        ∞                          Γ
(III-4) PV(t)0
E, sld   =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du  +  t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
        0                          0
                   A0         1–e
–r(1–t)Γ              α
   =  ——— + tC {————— – —————}
                  α +r          r(1–t) Γ           α +r(1–t)
                             α
    =  PV0
E + tC {(DA) – —————}  .
                          α +r(1–t)
DA denotes the value of straight-line depreciation allowances per monetary unit like the
euro or dollar (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).8
Hence, the application of straight-line depreciation is advantageous and a tax paradox
occurs, when
                  α
(III-5) DA  >  ————  .
             α +r(1–t)
             α
If DA  = —————, there exists a critical Γ *.
         α +r(1–t)
For shorter tax-lives than Γ * straight-line depreciation provides investment incentives.
2.2. Debt finance
If the same investment is financed by debt completely, then
     ∞                                     s                                Γ
(III-6) PV(t)0
F, sld =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du – (1–t) ∫  rCe
–r(1–t)u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
   0                                          0                                0
1 – e
–r(1–t)s
 =  PV(t)0
E, sld – r(1–t)C {——————}
   r(1–t)
 =  PV(t)0
E, sld – {1 – e
–r(1–t)s}C  .
3. Taxation and geometric-degressive depreciation
The amount of geometric-degressive depreciation expense in the period u is measured
(III-7) Du
gdd  =  δ Ce
–δ u
where δ  is the geometric-degressive depreciation rate (0 < δ  < 1) and Ce
–δ u shows the net
book value of capital good in the period u.9
3.1. Equity finance
With equity finance and geometric-degressive depreciation the present value of the asset at
time 0 is
                                   ∞                              ∞
(III-8) PV(t)0
E, gdd  = (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + tC ∫  δ e
–{δ +r(1–t)}u du
                                   0                              0
                                              δ             α
   =  PV0
E + tC {———— – ————}  .
                                         δ +r(1–t)      α +r(1–t)
If δ  = α , then PV(t)0
E, gdd = PV0
E just as in the case with TED. If δ  > α , then PV(t)0
E, gdd >
PV0
E which, in turn, means that geometric-degressive depreciation provides incentives.
Proposition 1  In the situation of equity financing and geometric-degressive
depreciation, if δ  > α   there exists a corporate tax rate (tmax) that maximises the NPV of
the asset.
Proof In order to get the maximum corporate tax rate, we differentiate equation (III-8)
with respect to t
∂ PV(t)0
E, gdd
(III-9) ——————  =  0.
          ∂ t
After solving equation (III-9), the optimum corporate tax rate (tmax
gdd) can be obtained as
a function of α , δ  and r
  αδ  + α r + δ r + r
2 –    α
2δ
2 + α
2δ r + αδ
2r + αδ r
2
(III-10) tmax
E, gdd =  —————————————————————
α r + r
2 + δ r10




Assumptions:  3 . 333 ; 100 ; 3 . 0 ; 1 . 0 ; 2 . 0 0 = = = = = C A r δ α
Source: Own calculations
For example, δ =30% in Macedonia. Under the assumptions shown in the Figure 1 the net
present value reaches maximum, when t = 59%.
3.2. Debt finance
Analogous to equation (III-6) in the case of debt financing
(III-11) PV(t)0
F, gdd  = PV(t)0
E, gdd – {1 – e
–r(1–t)s}C  .
4. Taxation and accelerated depreciation
Accelerated depreciation is used in practice as an investment promotion scheme in
combination with the straight-line depreciation method. Accelerated depreciation expense
(as a certain percentage share of investment cost) is tax-deductible in the first year of the
tax-life of a capital good.
3 Consequently, total depreciation expense in the first year
reaches
                    
3  Apart from the extra financial resources released in the beginning of an asset life (the so-called liquidity
advantage), which can again be used for an additional investment in the future (Nam, 1995), accelerated
depreciation reduces uncertainties and risks linked to the investment, since the total tax-life of a capital11
                              C
(III-12) D1
ad+sld  =  σ C + —— ,
                         Γ
where σ  indicates the accelerated depreciation rate (0 < σ  < 1).
Because an extra amount of expense can be deducted in the first year, the total tax-life
of a capital good is reduced correspondingly from Γ  to Ω . And
(III-13) Ω   =  (1 – σ )Γ   .
4.1. Equity finance
If there is equity finance, the present value of the asset with accelerated depreciation at
time 0 is
                                    ∞                                 1
(III-14) PV(t)0
E, ad  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + t ∫  σ Ce
–r(1–t)u du
                0                                 0
       Ω
  + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
                              0
                                      σ {1–e
–r(1–t)}        1–e
–r(1–t)Ω               α
  =  PV0
E + tC[————— + ————— – —————]  .
                                          r(1–t)                r(1–t)Γ            α +r(1–t)
4.2. Debt finance
When the same depreciation method prevails but the investment cost is fully covered by
debt,
(III-15) PV(t)0
F, ad  = PV(t)0
E, ad – {1 – e
–r(1–t)s}C  .
                                                            
good is significantly shortened (Tichy, 1980).12
IV. Consideration of Inflation
The investigated transition economies have suffered from the rapidly rising prices during
the last decade. The past inflation rate ranged in the Czech Republic between 52% in 1991
and 4.9% in 2001 compared to that in Poland between 70.3% in 1991 and 5.6% in 2001,
while some years even recorded triple digit inflation in Bulgaria and Romania. For
example, the annual change in the consumer price level varied between 333.5% in 1991
and 8.0% in 2001 in Bulgaria (EBRD, 2002). Due to the significance of inflation in these
countries, in the following chapter we revise the above analysis by relaxing the assumption
of constant prices.
In an economy with the constant inflation rate π , the stream of gross return which is
generated by an investment costing C at time u is
(IV-1) Au = A0e
–α ue
π u = A0e
–(α –π )u   .
In this case, the sum of annual gross return exponentially decreases at the rate α  (0 < α  <
1) but increases at the rate π  in the course of time.
1.  Straight-line depreciation
1.1. Equity finance
In the case of equity financing and employing the historical cost accounting method,
4 the
nominal present value of the asset with straight-line depreciation at time 0 is
                          ∞                                     Γ
(IV-2) nPV(t)0
E, sld  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α –π +µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–{µ (1–t)}u du
                          0                                    0
                       (1–t)A0                tC{1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ }
                   =  —————— + ——————
                      α –π +µ (1–t)              µ (1–t)Γ
                    
4  Under the historical cost accounting the capital to be recovered before a profit is recognised as simply
the amount of money originally invested in the firm. Historical profit is, therefore, the current period’s
revenues minus the historical cost of the inputs necessary to secure them, the current period’s
expenses. It has long been recognised that increases in input prices can cause historical cost accounting
to seriously overstate a firm’s ability to distribute its reported profits, continue producing the same13
                   1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ                   α –π
  = PV0
E + tC { —————— – —————— }  .
                      µ (1–t)Γ            (α –π )+µ (1–t)




F, sld  =  nPV(t)0
E, sld – {1 – e
–µ (1–t)s}C  .
2. Geometric-degressive depreciation
2.1. Equity finance
Correspondingly, with geometric-degressive depreciation, nominal present value with
equity finance is




gdd  =  (1–t) ∫  A0 e 
–{µ (1–t)+(α –π )}udu + tC ∫  δ  e 
–{δ +µ (1–t)}u du
         0           0
        δ                     α –π
 = PV0
E  + tC { —————— – —————— }




F, gdd  =  nPV(t)0
E, gdd – {1 – e
–µ (1–t)s}C  .
                                                            
physical volume of goods and services, and understate the firm’s capital.14
Box 1: Geometric-degressive depreciation, inflation and current cost accounting
5 in
Poland
In Poland, for example, geometric-degressive depreciation must be calculated based on the
current replacement cost if the annual inflation rate is higher than 10%. In this case the
nominal present value at year 0 can be expressed if there is equity finance
           ∞             ∞
(IV-6) nPV(t)*0
E, gdd  =  (1–t) ∫  A0 e 
–{µ (1–t)+(α –π )}udu + tC ∫  δ  e 
–{(δ –π )+µ (1–t)}u du
            0              0
           δ –π      α –π
        =  PV0
E + tC { —————— – —————— }  .
          (δ –π )+µ (1–t)     (α –π )+µ (1–t)
Apart from the assumption δ  = α  = 20% in Poland, tax depreciation is additionally
measured based on the current replacement cost, then nPV(t)*0
gdd  = PV0
E = C in the
equilibrium. The so-called tax neutrality is guaranteed in this case and inflation does not
disturb the investment decision at all. For the case of debt finance the nominal net present
value is also zero in the equilibrium, since nPV(t)*0
F, gdd = Ce
–µ (1–t)s .
3.  Accelerated depreciation
3.1. Equity finance
Furthermore, when accelerated depreciation and historical cost accounting method are
adopted
                                      ∞                                      1
(IV-7) nPV(t)0
E, ad  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{(α -π )+µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  σ Ce
–µ (1–t)u du
                                 0                                     0
           Ω
      + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–µ (1–t)u du
                                  0
                    
5  If input prices change, it is necessary to recover the cost of replacing the services consumed in
producing the goods or services for sale at their current prices. Therefore, the current cost accounting
is generally understood as accounting for the current replacement cost of non-monetary assets.15
                                      σ {1–e
–µ (1–t)}  
   1–e
–µ (1–t)Ω          α –π
  =  PV0
E + tC[————— + ————— – ——————]  .
                                          µ (1–t)              µ (1–t)Γ         (α –π )+µ (1–t)
3.2. Debt finance
On the other hand, with debt finance,
(IV-8) nPV(t)0
F, ad  = nPV(t)0
E, ad – {1 – e
–µ (1–t)s}C  .
V. Consideration of the Fictitious Profit and the Inflation Losses in
Present Value Model
The size of fictitious profits and the additional corporate tax burden, which are caused by
the application of the historical cost accounting method in the inflationary phase, can also
be measured on the basis of the net present value model.
6 Such inflation losses lead to the
reduction of nominal net present value. More precisely, the amount of increased tax
burden caused by inflation can be described as the difference between the two nominal
PVs, one with depreciation measured on the basis of current (replacement) value of a
capital good and the other with that determined on the basis of the historical cost
accounting method.
As shown above, in the case of employing the historical cost accounting method, the
nominal present value of the asset with straight-line depreciation at time 0 is
                          ∞                              Γ
(V-1) nPV(t)0
E, sld  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α –π +µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–{µ (1–t)}u du
                          0                              0
                             (1–t)A0            tC{1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ }
                     =  —————— + ——————  .
                          α –π +µ (1–t)              µ (1–t)Γ
                    
6  There have been a number of attempts to estimate the current value of a capital good on the basis of
indexation. “Such a method would provide for equitable accounting whether inflation rates were high or
low. [But] many agree that it would be too complicated to compute the rate of inflation for the multitude
of different assets. The idea of using an overall index was rejected on the grounds that some assets such as
computers actually [decline] in price over time and this method would bias investment towards those
assets that increased in price” (Evans, 1983, p.150).16
On the other hand, when depreciation expense is determined on the basis of current
investment cost, the nominal value of the asset with the same depreciation method at time
0 is
                              ∞                                     Γ
(V-2) nPV(t)0
E, sld*  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α –π +µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–{µ (1–t)–π }u du
                               0                                    0
              (1–t)A0           tC{1–e
–{µ (1–t)–π }Γ }
                         =  —————— + ———————
                      α –π +µ (1–t)           {µ (1–t)–π }Γ
where the current investment cost at time u is Ce
π u.
The difference between nPV(t)0
E, sld and nPV(t)0
E, sld* is defined as the present value of
additional corporate tax burden (inflation losses) at time 0 (ATB0
E, sld), which is caused by
the fictitious profit. With the critical tax-life of a capital good Γ *, therefore
               1–e
–{µ (1–t)–π }Γ *      1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ *
(V-3) ATB(Γ *)0
E, sld   =  tC[—————— – ——————]  =  tC(FP0
E, sld)
         {µ (1–t) –π }Γ *       µ (1–t)Γ *
where FP0
E, sld indicates the present value of fictitious profit per monetary unit at time 0 in
the case of adopting straight-line depreciation. In order to examine whether and to what
extent generous tax depreciation provisions promote private investments in inflationary
situations, the value FP0
E, sld (with Γ *) can be adopted as the benchmark. For this type of
examination, the difference in financial structure does not play any role, since the annual
interest is also calculated based on the historical total sum of debt at the fixed rate at the
year 0.
Proposition 2  When the amount of annual depreciation expense is calculated on the
basis of historical cost, as it is the case in practice in transition economies, the incentive
effect of geometric-degressive depreciation on private investment in an inflationary phase
can also be measured by
(V-4) nPV(t)0
E, gdd – nPV(t, Γ *)0
E, sld
        δ           1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ *
=  tC[—————– – ——————]  =  tC(IE0
E, gdd)
             δ +µ (1–t)             µ (1–t)Γ *17
where nPV(t)0
gdd is the nominal present value of the asset at time 0 with geometric-
degressive depreciation.
Proposition 3  When the amount of annual depreciation expense is calculated on the
basis of historical cost, the incentive effect of accelerated depreciation on private
investment in an inflationary phase can be measured by
(V-5) nPV(t)0
E, ad – nPV(t, Γ *)0
E, sld
              σ {1–e
–µ (1–t)}       e
–µ (1–t)Γ * – e
–µ (1–t)Ω *
=  tC [—————— +  ————————]  =  tC(IE0
E, ad)
                 µ (1–t)                    µ (1–t)Γ *
where nPV(t)0
ad is the nominal present value of the asset with accelerated depreciation at
time 0 and Ω * denotes the reduced tax-life of a capital good, when Γ  = Γ *.
Therefore, generous tax depreciation measures simply compensate the inflation losses in
full-scale, if
(V-6) IE0
E, sld  =  FP0
E, sld
(V-7) IE0
E, gdd  =  FP0
E, sld
(V-8) IE0
E, ad  =  FP0
E, sld
In spite of inflation, tax depreciation rules shown above guarantee investment promotion
effects, when IE values (i.e. IE0
E, sld, IE0
E, gdd and IE0
E, ad) are greater than FP0
E, sld.
VI. International Comparison of Effects of Tax Incentive System on
Equipment Investment
Table 1 compares the highest corporate tax rate (for retained earnings), tax depreciation
methods and the extent of their generosity, which are presently allowed in the context of
tax law in seven selected Eastern European countries. In the ranking of the statutory
corporate tax rate, the Czech Republic ranks first at 31%, followed by Poland (28%) and
Romania and Slovenia (25%). The corporate tax rate is the lowest in Macedonia (15%). In
Hungary and Slovenia only the straight-line depreciation method can be adopted for18
equipment. As mentioned above, in countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and
Macedonia geometric-degressive depreciation is usually applied as the investment
incentive scheme for equipment, of which, however, the rate ranges from 20% (Poland) to
30% (Macedonia).
7 Furthermore, accelerated depreciation can be combined with straight-
line depreciation in Romania and even for certain assets acquired after 1998 in Bulgaria.
The normal tax-life for equipment amounts to 10 years in the selected countries (except
for the Czech Republic where the computations are based on a 12-year tax life).
According to the net present value calculated under the standard assumptions for the
case of investing in equipment (i.e. A0 = 100, r = 10%, α  = 20%, C = 333.3), the
Romanian tax incentives which can be adopted for the specific investments guarantee the
most favourable conditions for the investors in the case of ignoring the impact of
anticipated inflation (see Table 1). In a descending order, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Macedonia
and Hungary also provide investment incentives. On the other hand, the Polish corporate
tax systems remains tax-neutral, since δ  is set to be the same as the assumed α , and,
therefore, NPV reaches zero in this country. In the Czech Republic — with equity
finance and without inflation — a negative net present value was computed.
8
Moreover Tables 1 - 4 indicate that the NPV for equipment investments financed with
debt is higher than that with equity finance. Even the Czech system tends to promote
private investment if it is financed by debt. In addition the gap between the nominal NPV
with debt finance and that with equity finance becomes continuously larger with rising
inflation. This evidence confirms the conventional wisdom.
As mentioned above, the application of the historical cost accounting method when
calculating the corporate tax base causes fictitious profits in inflationary phases that are
also subject to tax. Therefore, the extra tax burden increases with the corporate tax rate by
the given inflation rate. For example, in spite of inflation, the ‘true’ investment incentive
effects can be guaranteed in Romania (under the given assumptions for other relevant
parameters), when IE0
E, ad (the difference between nominal present value per monetary unit
at the investment year with accelerated depreciation combined with straight-line
depreciation) exceeds FP0
E, sld (the nominal present value of fictitious profit per monetary
unit at the same year in the case of adopting straight-line depreciation). According to the
model simulation summarised in Table 5, the current Romanian and Slovenian tax
incentive systems no longer stimulate private investment in equipment when, ceteris
                    
7  In the Czech Republic there is a special depreciation scheme over 12 years. Following the tax law, the
geometric-degressive depreciation rates applied start with 8.33% for the first year, and first rise and
then decline during the subsequent years (Table 1).
8  Under the given assumptions made for the calculation, the net present value with Γ  = 10 changes
marginally from –1.0 and –2.3 to –0.2, when the corporate tax rate increases from 10% and 40% to 90%.
In many other similar studies the critical (or economic) asset-life (Γ *) is (sometimes implicitly) assumed
to be around 10 years for equipment (see also Sinn, Leibfritz and Weichenrieder, 1999, Leibfritz and
Meuerer, 1985; Bordignon, Giannini and Panteghini, 1999).19
paribus, the annual inflation rate reaches 12%. On the other hand, the Hungarian system
appears to be less robust against inflation, since the investment incentives start to become
negative already at an inflation rate of 4%, whereas incentive effects cannot be expected in
Bulgaria when the inflation rate is higher than 6%.20
Table  1   International comparison of tax incentives measured in terms of net present value without inflation: investment in
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Geometric-degressive depreciation (30%)
Straight-line depreciation  (14.5%)
3
Straight-line depreciation in 3 years
Accelerated depreciation (50%) + straight-line
depreciation in 10 years
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assumptions C = PV0
E  = 333.3; A0 = 100; r =10%; α  = 20%; 0 < u < ∞
* The depreciation rate amounts to 8.33% for the first year and 15.28%, 13.89%, 12.5%, 11.11%, 9.72% , 8.33% , 6.94% , 5.56%, 4.17%, 2.78% and 1.39% for the
consequent years, respectively.
1. The rate will be reduced to 24% in 2003 and 22% for 2004 and future years.
2. In general the straight-line method is applied, in certain cases the declining-balance method may be allowed too. For certain types of assets (such as machinery that may    
  become obsolete because of technological developments), depreciation rates may be doubled.
3. For automation equipment, computers, equipment for environmental protection, medical equipment the rate of 33% applies.
4. Assets may be depreciated using the straight-line method. Useful life for machinery – 4 to 10 years. If the cumulative inflation rate for the preceding 3 years exceeded       
  100%, assets may be re-valued annually. Companies may use accelerated depreciation if they meet certain criteria subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
5. For some assets which are acquired on or after 1.01.1998 accelerated depreciation at a rate of up to 30% is allowed.
Sources: IBFD (1999), Central & East European Tax Directory; Wirtschaftsrecht der Osteuropäischen Staaten (1998), Lieferung, October 1999; Ernst & Young: Worldwide
Corporate Tax Guide: http://www.ey.com/global/gcr.nsf/EYPassport/Welcome-Worldwide_Corporate_Tax_Guide-EYPassport; Own calculations.21
Table  2 International comparison of tax incentives measured in terms of net present value with 2% inflation: investment in
equipment with the normal tax-life of 10 years
Nominal net present value
Debt finance
(= nPV(t)0
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Geometric-degressive depreciation (30%)
Straight-line depreciation  (14.5%)
3
Straight-line depreciation in 3 years
Accelerated depreciation (50%) + straight-line
depreciation in 10 years
4































assumptions C = PV0
E  = 333.3; A0 = 100; r =10%; α  = 20%; 0 < u < ∞ ; π  = 2%
* The depreciation rate amounts to 8.33% for the first year and 15.28%, 13.89%, 12.5%, 11.11%, 9.72% , 8.33% , 6.94% , 5.56%, 4.17%, 2.78% and 1.39% for the
consequent years, respectively.
1. The rate will be reduced to 24% in 2003 and 22% for 2004 and future years.
2. In general the straight-line method is applied, in certain cases the declining-balance method may be allowed too. For certain types of assets (such as machinery that may    
  become obsolete because of technological developments), depreciation rates may be doubled.
3. For automation equipment, computers, equipment for environmental protection, medical equipment the rate of 33% applies.
4. Assets may be depreciated using the straight-line method. Useful life for machinery – 4 to 10 years. If the cumulative inflation rate for the preceding 3 years exceeded       
  100%, assets may be re-valued annually. Companies may use accelerated depreciation if they meet certain criteria subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
5. For some assets which are acquired on or after 1.01.1998 accelerated depreciation at a rate of up to 30% is allowed.
Sources: IBFD (1999), Central & East European Tax Directory; Wirtschaftsrecht der Osteuropäischen Staaten (1998), Lieferung, October 1999; Ernst & Young: Worldwide
Corporate Tax Guide: http://www.ey.com/global/gcr.nsf/EYPassport/Welcome-Worldwide_Corporate_Tax_Guide-EYPassport; Own calculations.22
Table  3 International comparison of tax incentives measured in terms of net present value with 4% inflation: investment in
equipment with the normal tax-life of 10 years
Nominal net present value
Debt finance
(= nPV(t)0
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3
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assumptions C = PV0
E  = 333.3; A0 = 100; r =10%; α  = 20%; 0 < u < ∞ ; π  = 4%
* The depreciation rate amounts to 8.33% for the first year and 15.28%, 13.89%, 12.5%, 11.11%, 9.72% , 8.33% , 6.94% , 5.56%, 4.17%, 2.78% and 1.39% for the
consequent years, respectively.
1. The rate will be reduced to 24% in 2003 and 22% for 2004 and future years.
2. In general the straight-line method is applied, in certain cases the declining-balance method may be allowed too. For certain types of assets (such as machinery that may    
  become obsolete because of technological developments), depreciation rates may be doubled.
3. For automation equipment, computers, equipment for environmental protection, medical equipment the rate of 33% applies.
4. Assets may be depreciated using the straight-line method. Useful life for machinery – 4 to 10 years. If the cumulative inflation rate for the preceding 3 years exceeded       
  100%, assets may be re-valued annually. Companies may use accelerated depreciation if they meet certain criteria subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
5. For some assets which are acquired on or after 1.01.1998 accelerated depreciation at a rate of up to 30% is allowed.
Sources: IBFD (1999), Central & East European Tax Directory; Wirtschaftsrecht der Osteuropäischen Staaten (1998), Lieferung, October 1999; Ernst & Young: Worldwide
Corporate Tax Guide: http://www.ey.com/global/gcr.nsf/EYPassport/Welcome-Worldwide_Corporate_Tax_Guide-EYPassport; Own calculations.23
Table  4 International comparison of tax incentives measured in terms of net present value with 6% inflation: investment in
equipment with the normal tax-life of 10 years
Nominal net present value
Debt finance
(= nPV(t)0
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Straight-line depreciation in 3 years
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assumptions C = PV0
E  = 333.3; A0 = 100; r =10%; α  = 20%; 0 < u < ∞ ; π  = 6%
* The depreciation rate amounts to 8.33% for the first year and 15.28%, 13.89%, 12.5%, 11.11%, 9.72% , 8.33% , 6.94% , 5.56%, 4.17%, 2.78% and 1.39% for the
consequent years, respectively.
1. The rate will be reduced to 24% in 2003 and 22% for 2004 and future years.
2. In general the straight-line method is applied, in certain cases the declining-balance method may be allowed too. For certain types of assets (such as machinery that may    
  become obsolete because of technological developments), depreciation rates may be doubled.
3. For automation equipment, computers, equipment for environmental protection, medical equipment the rate of 33% applies.
4. Assets may be depreciated using the straight-line method. Useful life for machinery – 4 to 10 years. If the cumulative inflation rate for the preceding 3 years exceeded       
  100%, assets may be re-valued annually. Companies may use accelerated depreciation if they meet certain criteria subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
5. For some assets which are acquired on or after 1.01.1998 accelerated depreciation at a rate of up to 30% is allowed.
Sources: IBFD (1999), Central & East European Tax Directory; Wirtschaftsrecht der Osteuropäischen Staaten (1998), Lieferung, October 1999; Ernst & Young: Worldwide
Corporate Tax Guide: http://www.ey.com/global/gcr.nsf/EYPassport/Welcome-Worldwide_Corporate_Tax_Guide-EYPassport; Own calculations.24
Table 5  International comparison of investment promotion effect of tax depreciation rules in inflationary phases measured in terms
of nominal net present value
Poland Macedonia Hungary Slovenia Romania Bulgaria
Inflation rate %
TC (IE0





























































































































































assumptions t=28%; δ =20% t=15%; δ =30% t=18%; Γ =7 years t=25%; Γ =3 years t=25%; σ =50% t=20%; Γ =5 years
Common
assumptions C=PV0 = 333.3; A0=100; r=10%; α =20%; Γ  = Γ * =10 years and 0 < u < ∞
Source: Table 1 and own calculations25
VII. Conclusion
When calculating corporate tax profits, depreciation is deducted from a gross stream of
return generated from the asset. From the point of view of the competitive firm which tries
to maximise profits, this study compares — on the basis of net present value models and
their simulation — incentive effects of various tax depreciation methods under the
particular consideration of financial structure and inflation. These effects are determined
based on the Samuleson’s true economic depreciation. For the purpose of international
comparison, seven Eastern European countries are investigated — Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
Ceteris paribus, the Romanian tax depreciation system which can be adopted for the
specific investments presently guarantees the most favourable conditions for the investors,
followed by Slovenia, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Hungary. The Polish corporate tax
systems remains tax-neutral, since its depreciation rate is the same as the assumed TED
rate. In general the corporate tax system more strongly triggers the investment financed
by debt, whereas the gap between the nominal NPV with debt finance and that with
equity finance is positively correlated with the inflation rate. The latter empirical
evidence confirms the conventional wisdom.
This study suggests a possibility for existing a corporate tax rate which maximises the
NPV of the asset. Taking the Macedonian geometric-degressive depreciation rate (= 30%)
as an example, the model simulation made in this study demonstrates that the optimum tax
rate would reach around 60%, which is far higher than the current rate of 15% in this
country. This fact tends to revive the ‘old’ argument that tax incentives can also be
guaranteed to firms in a combined form of a higher tax rate with a generous depreciation
scheme. Prior to the beginning of 1980s such an opinion was quite popular in European
countries. Thereafter, Europe experienced a series of corporate tax reforms, of which
reasons and purposes have been primarily explained in the context of tax competition.
The aspect of inflation linked with different depreciation rules is of particular
importance in transition countries where their economies have been confronted with rising
prices during the last decade. In particular the application of the historical cost accounting
method causes fictitious profits in inflationary phases. Therefore, the extra tax burden
increases with the corporate tax rate by the given inflation rate. In this sense the selection
of lower corporate tax rates can also be justified in most of the investigated countries.
Under the given parameter assumptions and the annual inflation rate of 12%, however,
even the most favourable Romanian scheme does not seem to provide any ‘true’ incentive
effects but only adequately compensates such inflation losses.
Future research appears to be necessary in order to systematically compare the present
value approach and its major outcomes with the cost of capital or marginal effective rate26
methodology that is often used in a similar context (Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2002;
Chennells and Griffith, 1997). Furthermore, since the investigated countries have different
risk profiles which implicitly determine the respective interest rates, it would be interesting
to consider the aspect of different interest rates for future research as well. This could
deliver a better insight into how and to what extent the various tax regimes applied in
these transition countries influence firms’ investment decisions.
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